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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 994 of 1979, decided on 1st January, 1980.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 28th November 1979 in S. A. O. 675/79) .

‑‑ S. 13 (2) (vi)‑Ejectment on ground of requirements of premises by landlord for reconstruction‑Ingredients of cl. (vi) of S. 13 (2) : (a) rented premises reasonably and in good faith required by landlord for reconstruction and (b) landlord obtained necessary sanction for reconstruction‑Sanction for reconstruc tion from Municipal authority ‑ Held: Condition precedent for success of ejectment application but not for making such application under clause (vi)‑Sanction though not filed with application yet plea to such effect raised‑Tenant. held, given notice of such fact, hence, no prejudice caused to him by filing of sanction subsequently before close of case.

Aziz Begum v. Guarantee Life & Employment Insurance P L ‑D 1975 Lah. 594 and Mohammad Akbar and another v. Dr. Muhammad Rafique etc, 1980 C M R 483 ref.

Muhammad Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondent.

Date of hearing , 22nd December, 1979

‑The ejectment petition against the petitioner was accepted on the ground that the rented premises were required for reconstruction. The petitioner's appeal from the order of the Rent Controller was rejected as also his second appeal (S. A. O. 675/75).Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.

The point raised in the petition is that as the‑ respondent had not obtained the necessary sanction for reconstruction from the Municipal authorities as required by section 13 (2) (vi) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance (hereinafter called the Ordinance) at the time of filing the ejectment application the same was premature. On the basis of Aziz Begum v. Guarantee Life and Employment Insurance F L D 1975 Lah. 594 was sub mitted that the sanction obtained by the respondent on 25th November 1978 during the pendency of the ejectment application did not cure this defect. The High Court, on the other hand, following Mohammad Akbar and another v. Dr. Muhammad Rafique etc. (2) declined to accept this submission.

In the last mentioned case, a plea for eviction based on reconstruc tion had not been taken in the ejectment application as originally instituted but was allowed to be raised through an order allowing the amendment. The question arose in that case whether such amendment at a belated stage could be allowed so as to also bring the case of the petitioner under section 13 (2) (vi) of the Ordinance. While the decision in this case to some degree supports the view taken by the High Court, we think that there is another way of looking at the matter.

The clauses of subsection 1980 S C M R 483 of section 13 which precede the one under examination, namely, clause (vi) thereof, stipulate grounds fort eviction of the tenant on his having done some thing which the law did not permit or failure to do something which under the law he was enjoined to do. For example, if a landlord asserts that the tenant had committed default in the payment of rent an application for ejectment would be maintainable at his instance. Again, where a tenant has sublet the premises, used the premises for a purpose different from that let, committed acts which impair the value and utility of the rented premises, then an ejectment application would lie against him. In all these cases the cause or ground should be available at the time of making the application because the act made culpable is a completed act or which is already in existence. Similarly, something, which ought to have done, has indeed not been done. But the position under clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 is somewhat different. This clause may be said to include two important ingredients. One, the rented premises is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for reconstruction. Two, the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the reconstruction. It will be seen that cause of action can arise to a landlord if he reasonably requires the rented premises in good faith for reconstruction. In other words, if he states this much in his ejectment application, his application would be maintainable and the Rent Controller cannot refuse to entertain it. As far as the second ingredient regarding sanction for reconstruction from the Municipal or such like authority is concerned. it would be a condition precedent for the success of ejectment application. But if there is sanction and it is valid is a matter, which will have to be seen from the evidence and argument stage respectively because the existence of sanction will be a matter of proof and its validity a question for argument. But to say that a condition precedent for the final favourable outcome of the landlord's application is also a condition precedent for the making of the application under clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 does not appear to be correct. In the instant case a plea based on clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 13 had admittedly been raised in the application but the sanction for reconstruction had not been obtained at the time of making the application.

We feel that the plea having been raised by the respondent was sufficient to make his application maintainable. Admittedly, the necessary sanction had been obtained on 25th November, 1978 and brought on record m the respondent's evidence before the Rent' Controller and formed the bask of his decision. In the absence of the Code of Civil applicable to proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance except to the extent mentioned in section 16 thereof, it cannot be said nor indeed it appears to be' so that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Once a plea of the kind in question had been raised in the ejectment application, the tenant, petitioner herein had adequate notice of it. On this score also the petition would be in order. The acceptance of the plea, however, rested on the respondent establishing the factum of the sanction having been obtained. If he, indeed, has adduced evidence of it, we fail to see how the petitioner can really grumble.

The upshot is that no ground is made out for interference with order of the High Court. This petition' therefore fails and is dismissed hereby, The petitioner, however, is allowed four months time to vacate the premises provided he continues to pay the monthly rent.

Petition dismissed.

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