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‑‑ R. 71(2)‑Revocation of licence‑Licence standing in name of a partnership firm and all partners except respondent C dying‑Surviving partner C himself praying for revocation of licence‑Petitioner, son of one of deceased partners, though interested in property yet his share as well as shares of other claimants not yet determined and still subject matter of civil litigation‑Held : Regardless of whether District Magistrate had authority to seal Cinema, his order just and proper in circumstances of case and could not be interfered with until question of title finally decided by civil Court.

Muzaffar Qadir for Petitioners. Muhammad Yamin for A.‑G.

Khaill‑ur‑Rahman Khan for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Rana Abdur Rahim for

Respondents Nos. 5 to 29. Dates of hearing : 7th, 12th, 21st November, 1977.

The dispute in this case relates to Cinema House called Babar Cinema' belonging to a partnership firm called "Jahangir Khan and Company". The original partners of the firm were five persons, namely, Jahangir Khan, Wazir Khan, Karnel Khan, Puran Khan and Chand Khan, closely related inter se. In course of time, four out of them died one after another and the only surviving partner is the last mentioned who is a respondent. The petitioner Muhammad Nadir Khan is a son of Puran Khan who died in 19751eaving behind three daughters and 8 sons. This firm was running the cinema under a licence issued by the District Magistrate under the Cinematograph Act. But it appears the petitioner has been managing the affairs of the cinema on behalf of all other co‑sharers since 1971.

On an application moved by Chand Khan respondent, the sole surviving partner, the District Magistrate concerned revoked the licence and directed that until a fresh licence was granted to the heirs of the deceased licensees the cinema house be sealed. It is this order of the District Magistrate which is under challenge in this writ petition along with his consequent orders dated 9-8-1977 and 17-8-1977. .

2. The petitioner claims to be a partner of the firm on the basis of succession. But he has not been able to show either that he could succeed his father as a partner under the terms of the partnership deed or that he has ever been made a partner of the firm in accordance with its terms.

It may, however, be asserted on his behalf that he being a successor in-interest of one of the partners has a share in the property owned by the partnership firm and that to the extent of that share he has inherited the assets and liabilities of the firm. A rough calculation will show that his share on the basis of inheritance in the entire property is less than 2 %. He, however, claims to have purchased 25 per cent share, in addition to his inheritance, from other co-sharers. But from the material placed before me it is evident that the petitioner's claim is based only on an agreement of sale and not on a concluded sale. The agreement is yet to be given effect to. Most of the other co-sharers in the property including his own brothers except one have joined hands to oppose him and to contest this writ petition.

3. There are two questions to be considered in this case : Firstly whether the revocation of the licence is valid. And secondly, whether the District Magistrate had the authority to seal the property in question.

4. As for the first question, the learned District Magistrate has relied upon Rule 71 (2) of the Punjab Cinematograph Rules, 1976 for his authority to revoke the licence, according to which the licence stand revoked on the death of the licensee. In this case the licensee was the firm now represented by a single surviving partner. And since the surviving licensee has himself prayed for the revocation of the licence, no other person has a right to challenge it.

5. As to the second question, it may be noted that the petitioner is one of the several persons interested in the property. In fact, the property is already the subject-matter of civil litigation. It is for the civil Court to determine the share of each co-sharer if the co-sharers cannot on their own decide this question.

6. Therefore, regardless of whether the District Magistrate had the authority to seal the Cinema House (or the machine-room of the cinema). I do not feel called upon, until the question of title is finally decided by the Civil Court or an interim order with regard to the possession of the property is passed, to interfere with the order of the District Magistrate which is just and proper in the circumstances of the case and is if vacated, likely to create complications. However, it shall always be subject to the order of the Civil Court seized of the matter.

7. With this observation, I dismiss the writ petition leaving the parties, in the circumstances of the case, to brar their own costs.

s. A. H- Petition dismissed.

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