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‑‑ O. III, r. 4(2), (3)‑Continuance of power of Advocates‑Execution proceedings‑Continuance of proceedings of suit‑Power of Advocate for plaintiff, held, would continue for purpose of execution application. [Mehreen Zaibun Nesa v. Land Commissioner, Multan P L D 1975 S C 397 held not applicable].‑[Power of attorney].

Mehreen Zaibun Nesa v. Land Commissioner, Multan P L D 1975 S C 397 held not applicable.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑

O. III, r. 4 (1)‑Representation‑Power of attorney‑Contention that even in original suit Advocates appearing in case in hand did not file their power‑Could not be allowed to be raised for first time in present review application, there bring no error apparent on face of record‑Plaint in original suit however filed by Advocates appearing in review proceedings and they even purchased court‑fee stamps‑Plaint also signed by present Advocates of decree‑holder and no objection raised by office although some other objections raised‑Vakalatnama of Advocates in circumstances appearing to have been misplaced and objection as to lack of power of Advocates to appear, held, without substance.‑[Power of attorney].

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑

‑‑ O. III, r. 4 read with Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973), S. 22‑Representation of parties before Court a matter pertaining to procedure whereas Act XXXV of 1973 an enactment dealing with law relating to legal practitioners and their rights and obligations‑No question of one Act overriding provisions of other Act‑Absence of words "and shall be deemed to be in force although determined etc." in S. 22(3) of Act XXXV of 1973 although appearing in O.III, r. 4, held, does not made any conflict between two provisions and both enactments stand together without coming into conflict with each other.‑[Interpretation of statutes].

Muhammad Haneef for Saleem Akhtar for the Decree‑Holder.

U. Naimat Moulvi for the Judgment‑Debtor No. 3.

Date of hearing i 27th January 1979.

By the present application judgment‑debtor No. 3 is seeking review of order passed by me on 15‑11‑1976 whereby the aforesaid Judgment‑Debtor's application under section 22 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 was dismissed.

2. The aforesaid earlier order deals exhaustively with the objection raised by Mr. Moulvi that the present Advocate for the Decree‑Holder has no authority to present the execution application. However, Mr. Moulvi has chosen to make the present application for review of the said order.

3. The first submission of Mr. Moulvi is that it has, been wrongly held in the previous order that the deeming provisions in clause (2) of rule 4 of Order III, C. P. C. do not extend to the execution application, inasmuch as clause (3) of the said Rule exhaustively provides for the proceedings, in which the original appointment of an Advocate will continue to be operative. He, therefore, contended that since execution proceedings are conspicuously missing from clause (3), there was no scope for applying the deeming clause contained in clause (2) to execution proceedings. In this behalf learned counsel referred to P L D 1975 S C 397 wherein their Lordships elucidated the effect of the deeming clause. However, in my opinion the principles laid down in this decision are of no help in the present case. I have already dealt at length with the contention now being raised by the counsel and in my opinion, execution proceedings are a continuation of the A proceedings of the suit and would, therefore, be covered by the provision of clause (2) so that the power of the Advocate for the plaintiff would continue for the purposes of the execution application. I, therefore, find no substance in the contention and there is no error of law in the previous order.

4. It was then half‑heartedly contended by Mr. Moulvi that even in the original suit the present Advocates have not filed their power. In the first place this objection cannot be raised for the first time in the present review application and there is no error apparent on the face of the order under review so far as this question is concerned. However, it was pointed out to me by Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khan that the plaint in the original suit w filed by the present Advocates who had even purchased the court‑fee stamps. The plaint is also signed by the present Advocates of the Decree‑Holder and no objection was raised by the Office, although other objections were raised, that the plaint was not accompanied by the proper vakalatnama. It seems that the vakalarnama of the Advocate may have misplaced from the record. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention also.

5. Lastly it was contended by Mr. Moulvi that I had wrongly assumed in the main order that there was no conflict between the provisions of section 22 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 and the .provisions of order III, rule 4, C P. C. It may be mentioned that this argu ment was advanced in support of the contention that there being conflict between the two provisions, the provisions of the Legal Practitioners. and Bar Councils Act would prevail, being a special law as compared to the C. P. C. which is the general law. The argument now advanced has no basis, firstly because in the main order I had reached the conclusion that the two statutes deal with different subject‑matters and so far as the procedure governing the trial and hearing of the proceedings in this Court are concerned, they are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Representation of parties before the Court is a matter pertaining to the procedure, whereas the Legal Practi tioners and Bar Councils Act is an enactment dealing with the law relating to the legal practitioners and their rights and obligations. There is, therefore, no question of the one Act overriding the provisions of the order. It was argued by Mr. Moulvi that in clause (2) of Order III, rule 4 the words "and shall be deemed to be in force although determined, etc." are missing from clause (3) of section 22 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 which is otherwise similar to the provisions contained in clause (1) of rule 4. I am unable to accept this submission. These words are missing from section 22 for the obvious reason that the continuance of the power of an Advocate in particular proceedings is a matter pertaining to the procedure of the Court and such a provision could not be made in section 22. Be that as it may, I find no conflict between the two provisions merely because some clause in one of the provisions is missing from the other. The two enactments can stand together without in any way coming into conflict with each other.

6. No other argument was advanced in support of the present application.

For the foregoing reasons, no grounds have been made out for review of the main order and, therefore, the application for review stands dismissed.

The remaining applications were not argued by the counsel as one of them is also a review application against the orders passed by Mr. Justice Naimuddin as pointed out by Mr. Moulvi. Let the office place the case before his Lordship for disposing of the application or orders as deemed fit.

S. A.H. Appeal dismissed.

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