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S. A. O. No. 72 of 1977 decided on 4th February 1977.

--S. 13(3)(a)(1)-Tenant, eviction of-Contention that eviction applica tion was premature inasmuch according to terms of written agreement period of tenancy had to expire on 30-4-75 while application for eviction moved on 28-4-75-No evidence showing notice of application having been issued and/or received by tenant before 30-4-75 and cause of action, at any rate, maturing during pendency of case, contention repelled.

Manzoor Ahmed Khan v. Syed Maqsood Ali P L D 1975 Lah. 1521 ref.

-- S 13(3)(a)(i)-Requirement of landlord being in occupation of an other residential building suitable for his need-Does not extend to cover rented premises.

Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez 1976 S C M R 52 rel.

--S. 13(3)(a)(i) -Tenant, eviction of - Bona fide requirement Contention that landlord merely expressed "desire" to occupy premises in dispute and such alone not sufficient to prove his bona fides Landlord in addition to desire making convincing statement on oath stating his bona fide need of premises for his wife, a heart patient, and due to his retirement and coming over to city-Landlord in such circumstances, held, could not be said to have merely expressed a desire-Mere desire expressed in a statement without adverting to other circumstances which might prove bona fides of landlord-Cannot be equated with a statement on oath relating facts and giving circum stances to show bona fides of landlord.

S h. Khushi Muhammad v. Kh. Muhammad Rashid Wain 1968 S C M R 1158(2) and Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir P L D 1975 Lah. 200 ref

Sardar Muhammad Tufail Khan for Appellant.

Learned counsel has in support of this tenant's second appeal against his eviction on ground of personal requirement of the respondent/landlord, contended firstly, that the application for eviction was premature as according to the terms of written agreement the period of tenancy was to expire on 30-4-1975 while the application for eviction was moved on 28-4-1975. Learned counsel in this behalf also stated that there was an oral agreement fixing the period of tenancy as 10 years and if that is believed, the application would be premature by more than 5 years ; secondly he contended that the respondent is occupying a house which it was not proved by him to be unsuitable for his needs ; and lastly, it is contended that the respondent merely expressed "desire" to occupy the premises in dispute,. He was required to show something more than mere desire in order to prove his bona fides.

2. I do not agree with the learned counsel that the application moved on 28-4-1975 was premature. In place of written agreement no importance can be attached to the so-called verbal agreement relied upon by the appellant. It is admitted that written agreement provided for a period of three years' tenancy which could be extended at the option of the appellant to another two years. There is no proof that this option was exercised in a regular manner. It appears that after three years the appellant continued as tenant on monthly basis. Be that as it may, it is not shown that the notice of the application filed by the respondent on 28-4-1975 was issued and/or received by the appellant before 30-4-1975, the so-called date of maturity of the cause o action. The principles discussed in Mansoor Ahmed Khan v. Syed Maqsood Ali P L D 1975 Lah. 1521, can be applied to this case as well, therefore, I do not agree with the learned counsel that the application for eviction was premature.

3. In respect of the second contention of the learned counsel, suffice it to refer to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Abdul Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvez 1976 S C M R 52. It was observed as follows:--

"The next contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that since the landlord was living in rented premises, he was in occupation of another residential building suitable for his needs in the same urban area and, therefore, he was not entitled to evict the petitioner. The requirement that the landlord should not be 1n occupation of another residential building suitable for his need at the tune does not in our view, extend to cover rented premises, for, otherwise the result would be that no landlord would be able to get his own premises vacated for his own occupation unless he can show that he is actually on the streets and has no place to live at all. It would be more reasonable to hold that the other residential accommodation, which the landlord is occupying at the time, must be shown to be his own and not merely rented premises".

In view of the above clear ruling on the argument raised by the learned counsel the same is repelled.

4. I do not agree with the learned counsel that the respondent merely expressed a desire to occupy the premises in dispute. In addition to this desire, he made convincing statement on oath that he needed the premises in good faith. His wife is a heart patient. He stated that she could not live in the present accommodation on account of the illness. He was earlier employed at Karachi and in the meanwhile had to shift to Lahore on account of his retirement. He did not find suitable accommodation for some time and had also to live as a lodger with relatives. All these circumstances cannot be termed as a mere desire. The cases cited by the learned counsel in this behalf do not; apply to the circumstances of this case. Mere desire expressed in a statement without adverting to other circumstances which might prove the bona fides of a landlord cannot be equated wish a statement on oath relating facts and giving circumstances to show the bona fides of the landlord. After taking note of the ruling in Sh. Khushi Muhammad v. Kh. Muhammad Rashid Wain 1968 S C M R 1158, I had held in Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir P L D 1975 Lah. 200, that mere subjective expression of "desire" by the landlord was not enough to prove good faith and bona fides. But this observation was made "subject to consi deration that one of the material items of evidence for consideration, of course, would be the statement on oath of the landlord himself" (See page 204 of the report). The question as to whether or not such a statement of the landlord should be believed is a different matter and depends upon the circumstances of each case. In this case the statements of facts made by the respondent have been accepted as true. No justification has been made out in this second appeal for setting aside the concurrent findings in this behalf, reached by the learned Rent Controller and the learned lower appellate Court. This appeal, accordingly, is dismissed in limine.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has requested for extension of time to vacate the premises because as stated by him the appellant's children are to, take examinations in the month of March. The appeal has been dismissed to limine. There is more than a month for the children to take the examination. No justification has been made out for extending the period to vacate the premises. The request is refused.

S. A. H. Appeal dismissed.

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