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Revision Application No. 3 of 1975, decided on 1st January 1976.

----S. 2(51:) read with Sched. II, para. 3(4)-'Blood" collected by Muni cipal Corporation at slaughterhouse and sold through auction -Held, "property".

The fact that the blood is property cannot be disputed for the word property', though not defined in the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972, is the generic term for all that a person has dominion over and is the most comprehensive of all the terms which can be used inasmuch as; it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which a party can have, the respondent has been selling blood collected by it at the slaughterhouse through auction. Therefore, no doubt whatsoever, is left that blood is property.

Jones v. Skinner (1835) 42 R R 274 ref.

-- S. 2(51) & Sched. II, para. 3(4) - "Refuse" - Blood of animals slaughtered in its slaughterhouse and collected by Municipal Corporation as "refuse" - Butchers, held, cannot lay claim for collection of such blood-Whether butchers could collect blood of their slaughtered animals without contravention of law and rules, and whether they could be deprived of their property save in accordance with law [Quaere]-Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 24.

Mohammad Ismail v. The Administrator (Controlling Authority), People's -Municipality, Sukkur R. A. No. 44 of 1974 not applicable.

K. A. Ghani for Applicant.

Mohammad Nasir Khan and Kazi Abdul Kadir for Respondent.

Dates of hearing: 3rd, 5th and 22nd December 1975.

The applicants are a registered association of butchers who carry on -their business of selling meat in Karachi. The butchers take their animals, such as cows, buffaloes, oxen, goats and sheep for slaughtering to K. M. C. approved slaughterhouse situated at Landhi. These animals, when slaughtered, produce meat, flesh, blood, offal, visceras, intestines etc.

2. The respondent claim blood of animals slaughtered in their slaughter -house as their property by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 3(4) of Schedule II to the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972 (herein after called the Ordinance) read with the definition of refuse' given in clause (51) of section 2 of the Ordinance. It will be useful' to-reproduce the above provisions:----

Section 2(51) of the Ordinance:---

"(51) refuse' includes rubbish, broken bricks mortar, broken glass, offal, night soil, sweepings, carcases of animals, deposit of sewerage, waste, blood and meat waste and any other offensive matter."

Paragraph 3(4) of Schedule II to the Ordinance:--

"(4) All refuse removed and collected by the staff of the People's Municipality or under their control and supervision and all refuse deposited in the dust-bins and other receptacles provided by the People's Municipality shall be the property of the People's Municipality."

3. Being aggrieved by the claim of the K. M. C. the applicants filed a suit, being Suit No. 1503 of 1974, against the respondent, in the Court of V Senior Civil Judge, and Assistant Sessions Judge, Karachi for declaration and injunction that blood of the slaughtered animals was their property and. prayed for injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with their right to collect blood of the slaughtered animals, and also applied for interim injunction. The V Senior Civil Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge, Karachi, by his order dated 31-7-1974 was pleased to grant the same. However, on miscellaneous appeal filed by the respondent, the VI Additional District Judge, Karachi, set aside the order of interim injunction passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Karachi.

4. The applicants having felt aggrieved by the order of the Additional District Judge, Karachi, passed in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 164 of 1974, have come to this Court in revision.

5. The short question involved for determination in this civil revision is whether on the interpretation of paragraph 3(4) of Schedule II read with section 2(51) of the Ordinance, a prima facie case for grant of interim relief was made out by the applicants or not.

6. According to the provisions of paragraph 3(4), 'refuse' and in the present case blood becomes the property of the People's Municipality if the same is removed and collected by the staff of the Municipality or under their control and supervision and all such refuse also becomes the property of People's Municipality if it is deposited in dust-bins and other receptacles, provided by the Municipality.

7. The applicants in para. 4 of the plaint as well as in para. 1(d) of the revision application have stated that they used to collect blood of the animals slaughtered at the slaughterhouse of the respondent as their own property but due to inadequate arrangement provided by the respondent substantial quantity of blood used to flow into gutter and that Karachi Municipal Corporation, respondent, was requested to do the needful but in vain. Consequently, the officers of respondent took up the work of collection of the blood assuring the butchers that the work of collection of blood would be restored to the butchers as soon as adequate arrangement was made. It is further stated that the respondent started treating the collection of blood as a matter of right although there never existed any such law, rule or bye-law by which the respondent was governed, and that the applicants and others approached the respondent to claim their legal right to their property, i.e. the slaughtered animal blood but the respondent refused to accept the title of the applicants who had started collecting blood. Thus it would appear from the statement of the applicants themselves that the blood was being collected by K. M. C. as refuse that used to flow into gutters though according to the applicants, the members of the applicants subsequently started collecting blood and since they were denied this right they had to seek legal remedy by filing the suit in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Karachi.

8. The fact that the blood is property cannot be disputed for the word 'property', though not defined in the Sind People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972, is the generic term for all that a person has dominion over and is the most comprehensive of all the terms which can tie used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which a party can have, as observed by Pepsy, M. R. in Jones v. Skinner ((1835) 42 R R 274). It is admitted before me by the learned Advocate for the respondent that the Karachi Municipal Corporation has been selling blood collected by it at this slaughter house through auction. Therefore, no doubt whatsoever, is left that blond is property.

9. Article 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law and this article further provides that no property shall be taken possession of save by the authority of law which provides compensation therefor, and Article 23 of the Constitution provides that every citizen has a right to dispose of property subject however, to the Constitution and any reasonable restriction imposed by law in public interest.

10. Therefore, it is necessary for the respondent to show under what law they can deprive the members of the applicants, who slaughter their animals at the slaughter house of the respondent, of their right to collect blood of their animals slaughtered at the slaughterhouse of the respondent. The learned Advocate for the petitioners as pointed out earlier has relied upon the provision of section 3(4) of Schedule II to the Ordinance and the definition of refuse given in clause 51 of section 2 of the Ordinance, but these provisions provide that refuse shall become the property of the respondent provided, it is removed and collected by the staff of the Municipality or under their control and supervision or the same is deposited in dust-bins and other receptacles provided by them.

11. On the averments made in para. 4 of the plaint, it is clear that blood of animals slaughtered in the slaughterhouse of the respondent was, in fact, being collected by the respondent as 'refuse'. Therefore, the applicants have no prima facie case at present and I see no reason to set aside the order of the Additional District Judge, Karachi, whereby he vacated the order of interim injunction passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Karachi. However, if blood of animals slaughtered by the members of the applicants at the slaughterhouse of the respondent can be collected by them without contravention of any rules, regulations or by laws of the respondent or any rules framed under the Ordinance or law, could they be deprived of their property save in accordance with law, is a question which requires consideration and can be decided in the suit.

12. I may mention, in support of his contention, Mr. K. A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the applicants relied upon an unreported judgment of this Court in the case of Mohammad Ismail v. The Administrator (Controlling Authority), People's Municipality, Sukkur (R. A. No. 44 of 1974), wherein the contention of the respondent was found to have merit of serious consideration and in such view of the matter the orders of the two Courts below refusing to the plaintiff interim relief of injunction was set aside and interim injunction granted. But in the present case, the admitted position is that the respon dent have been collecting blood as 'refuse' and, therefore, the case cited by the learned Advocate for the applicants is not of much help to the appli cants. The members of the applicants will be entitled to collect blood only if the same is not 'refuse' within the meaning of section 2(51) of the Ordinance and if they establish that they can collect the same without contravention of any rules, regulations or bye-laws of the respondent framed under the Ordinance or any law. Moreover, it is not shown to me that the members of the applicants would suffer any irreparable injury or more inconvenience, if the status quo is not allowed to continue till the applicants are able to establish that their members can collect the blood as stated above. I may also mention that the learned Senior Civil Judge, Karachi, who granted the interim injunction did not state how the applicants would have suffered if 'injunction was not granted and how the balance of convenience was in their favour.

13. For the reasons given above, I dismiss this Revision Application and in the circumstances of this case leave the parties to bear their own costs.

S. Q. Petition dismissed.

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