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Appeals No: LPR‑4 of 1970, heard on. 7th May 1970.

---Ss. 30 & 31‑ Temporary promote against higher post‑Reversion to lower substantive post‑ No violation of S. 30 and hence provisions of S. 31, held, not attracted‑‑West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance (IV of 1968), S's.37& 38.

---‑Appeal‑Evidence already on record sufficient to dispose of appeal‑No suggestion that appellant had some new evidence corning to his knowledge which he could not produce before Labour Court‑Prayer for new evidence, In circumstances, at lime of appeal, rejected.

Mirza Nazir Ahmad Naz for Appellant.

Nasirul Hasan for Respondent No. 2.

Date of hearing: 7th May 1970.

This is an appeal against an order of the learned Labour Court (Central Zone), Lahore; dated 2nd December 1969, on an application under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1959). The learned Court came to the conclusion that there was no violation of the provision of section 30 of the Ordinance of 19591 and, therefore; the application as not maintainable. It pay be mentioned here that section 30 of the Ordinance of 1959, is ‑equivalent to section 37 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance) and section 31 of the Ordinance of 1959, is equivalent to ‑section 38 of the repealed Ordinance.

2. I have heard. Mirza Nazir Ahmad Naz, the learned Representative for the appellant. His contention is two‑fold the contended, in the first place, that the appellant was promoted in a permanent vacancy and having completed the probationary period of three months as Traffic Assistant; he should not have been reverted to his original post as Conductor. In the second place, the learned Representative submitted that he should be given an opportunity to substantiate his allegation; that the appellant was promoted against a permanent post as Traffic Assistant.

3. I would briefly examine these two contentions separately.

4. The appellant's substantive post was that of Conductor. He has promoted as a Booking Clerk on 27th May1968. In the meantime, it appears, that there was a vacancy of Traffic Assistant‑ in the Department. He was promoted as Traffic Assistant on 8th August 1968. It may be; at this stage, made clear that there is nothing definite on the. record to establish that the post of Traffic Assistant was higher than that of the Booking Clerk. There is, however, one thing that lends support to the contention of Mr. Naz that the post of Traffic Assistant was higher than that of the Booking Clerk. Exhibit P‑1, dated 27th March 1968, the letter by which the appellant was promoted as Booking Clerk, states that the appellant was being promoted as Booking Clerk "against temporary vacancy caused due to temporary promotion of Mr. Fida Hussain as Traffic Assistant." This shows that the post of Traffic Assistant was higher than that of Booking Clerk. However, the real point for determination is as to whether the appellant was temporarily promoted as Booking Clerk and as Traffic, Assistant. The letter by, which be was promoted as temporary Booking Clerk clearly mentions that his promotion was temporary in place of Mr. Fida Hussain, who had been temporarily promoted as Traffic Assistant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellant had become a permanent Booking Clerk by virtue of Exh: P‑1, dated 27th March 1968, when he was promoted as Traffic Assistant. The appellant was promoted as Traffic Assistant through letter dated 8th August 1968, Exh. P‑2. Under this letter the appellant was promoted as Traffic Assistant temporarily for three months with effect from 8th August 1968 his clear from Exh. P‑2, that the appellant was promoted only for three months on temporary basis. His three months expired on 7th November 1968. Immediately, thereafter, i.e. on 14th November 1968, the appellant was reverted to his substantive post‑namely, as Conductor tinder toe order of the Director, Traffic, alongwith three others. In these circum stances, the appellant has failed to make out a case that his terms of‑ service, were, in any way, altered so as to attract the provision of section 38 of the repealed Ordinance.

5. I do not think it is a fit case to allow fresh evidence. All the material that the appellant has placed on the record is before me. I do not need any evidence to enable me to dispose of the appeal. It is not the case of the appellant that some new evidence has come to his knowledge, which he could not produce at the time when his matter was being heard by the learned Labour Court. In these circumstances, I cannot grant his request.

The appeal, for the reasons already given, is dismissed.

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