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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 44‑D of 1967, decided on 12th June 1967.

(On appeal from the order of the High Court of East Pakistan, Dacca, dated the 19th December 1966, in Petition No. Nil.

Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 215, read with Arts. 2, 4, 98 & 101‑(National languages)‑Rules of High Court requiring petitions, etc. to be submitted in English language‑Not repugnant to any provision of Constitution, neither void nor inoperative or of no legal effect‑Constitution does not debar or prohibit use of English until its replacement‑Permission in Art. 215 to use English suspends operation of substantive provision till such replacement‑Interpretation of statutes‑No words are redundant or surplusage ‑Meaning must be given to every word and provision read as a whole in fair and impartial manner in ordinary and general sense‑Writ petition against Registrar High Court's order returning a criminal revision petition drawn up in Bengali, instead of English, held, rightly rejected by High Court‑No violation of any provisions of Art. 2 or 4 ‑Practice (Supreme Court)‑Litigant being illiterate or unacquainted with English appearing in person, allowed to address Court in his own language Indulgence cannot be claimed as of right.

The rules of the High Court requiring petitions, etc., to be drawn up in English are, in no way, repugnant to any of the provisions of Constitution nor can they be said to be void or inoperative or to be of no legal effect . . . . . . Until arrangements have been made for the replacement of English rules requiring the use of English language for the conduct of official business cannot be held to be void.

The Constitution does not debar or prohibit the use of the English language for official and other purposes until arrangements for its replacement have been made, as envisaged in sub Article (2) of Article 215.

The contention that the words "the national languages of Pakistan are Bengali and Urdu" occurring in the beginning of sub‑Article (1) of Article 215 constitute the substantive portion of the Article and the rest of the words therein are in the nature of an exception which cannot limit the operation of the substan tive portion, is clearly untenable and erroneous, for, the purpose of the exception is clearly to suspend the operation of the substantive provision until such time as is indicated therein. Otherwise, the exception will be meaningless and otiose.

No words in a statute are redundant or surplusage. Meaning must be given to every word in a statute reading its provisions as a whole in a fair and impartial manner in the ordinary and general sense. Reading Article 215 in this sense it would be found to be impossible to give it the meaning suggested by the contention raised. To accept this interpreta tion would amount to defeating the very purpose of this Article which is manifestly to allow English to be used for the conduct of official business until other arrangements are made.

Held, therefore, that the writ petition, against order of Registrar, High Court, returning to the Advocate concerned, a criminal revision petition drawn up in Bengali instead of English, was clearly misconceived and was rightly dismissed.

There was no violation of any principle of Article 2, for, the rules of the High Court framed in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 for the regulation of its practice and procedure are as much law as any other statutory provision.

The Advocate's right to practise had also not been taken away, for, he can exercise this right subject to the rules of his High Court. Under Article 4 of the Constitution he is equally under the basic obligation to obey the law.

No violation of any fundamental right was involved in this case.

The Court had often, when a litigant appearing in person had been found to be an illiterate person or to be unacquainted with English, allowed him to address the Court in his own language with or without the assistance of an interpreter but the official business of the Supreme Court had of necessity to be conducted in English, as the Court was constituted of Judges from both wings of the country. This indulgence could not, however, be claimed as of right, particularly where it was patent that the litigant was an Advocate who in order to be enrolled as such must have acquired a certain amount of proficiency in the English language.

Petitioner in person.

Respondent not represented.

Ghias Muhammad, Attorney‑General for Pakistan (Abdur Rehman Chowdhury, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by A. W. Mallik, Attorney under Order XLV, S. C. R., 1956.

Raja Said Akbar, Advocate‑General West Pakistan instructed by S. M. Abbas, Attorney under Order XLV, S. C. R., 1956.

T. H. Khan, Advocate‑General East Pakistan (N. H. Bhuiyan, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Md. M. H. Khan Attorney under Order XLV, S. C. R., 1956.

Date of hearing: 12th June 1967.

.‑This is a petition for special leave to appeal from an order of a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan rejecting the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution filed to challenge the validity of an order of the Registrar of the said High Court whereby the latter had ordered that a criminal revision petition written in the Bengali script be "returned to the learned filing Advocate".

The petitioner before us is an Advocate enrolled on the rolls of the High Court of East Pakistan. Before that he had, after passing his Law Examination, been enrolled as a legal practitioner in the District Judge's Court, Dacca, since August 1963.

The petitioner admits in his petition that he passed his Matriculation Examination in English; that since then he has "somehow" passed in English all the examinations from the Matriculation to the University level. He claims, however, that since his enrolment as a legal practitioner he has been doing all his professional work through the medium of Bengali and has also pleaded in the District Courts in Bengali and has, as such, gradually forgotten his English.

It is, however, clear that he is sufficiently conversant with the English language, for, the orders and judgments even in the District Courts, so far as we are aware, are still written in the English language. To be able to practise in the District Courts one must be conversant with English in a fair measure, Nevertheless, the petitioner, on the 5th of December 1966, filed a criminal revision petition in the High Court of East Pakistan drawn up in the Bengali language, but the Commissioner of Oaths of the said High Court refused to have the affidavit verified on the Bengali petition without the Court's special permission. The petitioner then mentioned the matter before one of the learned Judges of the said High Court who directed him to see the Registrar in the matter. He then submitted a written complaint in Bengali before the Registrar alleging that the Commissioner of Oaths had illegally refused to verify the affidavit drawn up in Bengali. He further contended that the rules of the High Court requiring all petitions filed in the High Court to be drawn up in English were repugnant to the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of 1962 and were, therefore, void and inoperative. The Registrar, however, as already stated, ordered the petition to be returned to the Advocate by an endorsement to that effect on the original petition.

Against this order the petitioner moved the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the said petition summarily on the ground‑ that since Bengali had not yet been made a Court language no such petition written in Bengali could be moved before it. The Registrar had, therefore, rightly returned the said revisional application. It is against this order that the petitioner has filed a petition for special leave to appeal in this Court again drawn up in the Bengali language knowing full well that at least three members of this Court are unfamiliar with this language. In the interest of justice, however, the petition and its annexures were, under the orders of the learned Chief Justice, translated into English.

The petitioner, who has appeared in person, has, even though he is fully capable of understanding, and speaking in English, insisted upon addressing the Court to Bengali. It was suggested to him that since three of the members of the Bench were unfamiliar with the Bengali language he could, if he felt any real difficulty, have the assistance of some learned Advocate of this Court as amicus curiae to present his case in this Court in English but he declined to do so. He persisted, in utter disregard of even the rules of ordinary courtesy, in insisting that be had the right to speak in Bengali which was one of the recognised national languages.

This Court has often, when a litigant appearing in person has been found to be an illiterate person or to be unacquainted with English, allowed him to address the Court in his own language with or without the assistance of an interpreter but the official business of this Court has of necessity to be conducted in English, as this Court is constituted of Judges ' from both wings of the country. This indulgence cannot however, be claimed as of right, particularly where it is patent that the litigant is an Advocate who in order to be enrolled as, such must have acquired a certain amount of proficiency in the English language.

Be that as it may, we have heard the petitioner and perused his translated petition. According to the petitioner the rules of the High Court of East Pakistan requiring petitions and other proceedings in the said High Court to be made in English and the Rules of this Court which require vernaculur documents to be translated into English, are repugnant to the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution and therefore, void and inoperative.

This Article is in these terms :‑

"215.‑(1) The national languages of Pakistan are Bengali and Urdu, but this Article shall not be construed as preventing the use of any other language and, in particular, the English language may be used for official and other purposes until arrangements for its replacement are made.

(2) In the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy‑two, the President shall constitute a Commission to examine and report on the question of the replacement of the English language for official purposes."

On a plain reading of this Article it is clear that the Constitution does not debar or prohibit the use of the English language for official and other purposes until arrangements for its replacement have been made, as envisaged in sub‑Article (2) thereof.

The petitioner, however, insists that the words "the national languages of Pakistan are Bengali and Urdu" occurring in the beginning of sub‑Article (1) constitute the substantive portion of the Article and the rest of the words therein are in the nature of an exception which cannot limit the operation of the substantive portion. This contention is clearly untenable and erroneous, for, the purpose of the exception is clearly to suspend the operation of the substantive provision until such time as is indicated therein. Otherwise, the exception will be meaningless and otiose.

An interpretation, which will have this effect, cannot be adopted, for, it is an universally accepted rule of construction that no words in a statute are redundant or surplusage. Meaning must be given to every word in a statute reading its provisions as a whole in a fair and impartial manner in the ordinary and general sense. Reading Article 215 in this sense we find it impossible to give it the meaning suggested by the petitioner. To accept his interpretation would amount to defeating the very purpose of this Article which is manifestly to allow English to be used for the conduct of official business untili other arrangements are made.

The petitioner next attempted to argue that the refusal of the High Court to admit his Bengali petition amounted to a violation of a fundamental right and to depriving him of his in alienable right under Article 2 of the Constitution to be treated in accordance with law and only in accordance with law. He, did not specify as to which fundamental right was violated apart from suggesting that this would make it difficult for him to' practise in the High Court. We have also not been able to discover any specific fundamental right which can be said to have been violated in his case. There has, of course, been no violation of any principle of Article 2, for, the rules of the High Court framed in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 for the regulation of its practice and procedure are as much law as any other statutory provision. The petitioner has thus been treated in accordance with law and only in accordance with law.

His right to practise has also not been taken away, for, he can exercise this right subject to the rules of his High Court, for under Article 4 of the Constitution he is equally under the basic obligation to obey the law.

He has thus, in our opinion, no legitimate cause of complaint against the order of either the Registrar, or the Division Bench, of the High Court. The rules of the High Court are, in no way, repugnant to any of the provisions of the Constitution nor can they be said to be void or inoperative or to be of no legal effect. His writ petition in the High Court was clearly misconceived and was rightly rejected. Until arrangements have been made for the replacement of English rules requiring the use of English language for the conduct of official business cannot be held to be void.

No ground has, therefore, been made out for the grant of special leave in this case. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed, but we make no order as to costs.

A. H. Petition dismissed.

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