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Second Appeal No. 209 of 1966, decided on 30th May 1966.

Ss. 13 (6) & 15‑Ex pane interim order under S. 13(6) for deposit of rent‑Appeal by tenants‑Compromise between parties pending appeal‑Appellate Court whether not competent to dispose of matter finally in terms of compromise.

An ex parte interim order under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was passed directing the tenant to deposit accrued rent and future monthly rents in respect of premises in dispute. The tenant filed an appeal against the order. Pending appeal a compromise was filed and the appellate authority allowed the compromise and recorded: "Parties have compromised. Let it be recorded. Decree accordingly." In second appeal by the tenant it was argued that the appellate authority was not competent to dispose of the matter finally when the appeal before him was against the interim order passed under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance:

Held, nothing in law prevented the appellate authority from giving effect to the compromise reached by parties.

Malik Mohammad Saeed for Appellants.

Naimuddin for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 30th May 1966.

In this Second Appeal, the appellants seek to challenge an order dated the 30th of March 1966 passed by the District Judge. Tharparkar, at Mirpurkhas allowing a compromise application of the parties and consequently passing a consent decree in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1966 before him. The facts of the case are that the respondent filed an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 against the appellants in the Court of Rent Controller, Mirpurkhas requesting that the appellants be directed to put the respondent in possession of the house let out to them. On the 1st of March 1966, the Rent Controller passed an ex parte order under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance directing the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,5C0 within 15 days and also to deposit future rents in Court by the 15th of each calendar month until the disposal of the main case. This order was challenged by the appellants in an appeal before the District Judge and the matter was fixed for regular hearing on the 9th of April, 1965. It appears that the hearing of the appeal was anti‑dated at the request of the respondent and fixed for the 30th of March 1966. On that date a compromise application was filed by the parties which was allowed in terms of a short order to the effect "Parties have compromised. Let it be recorded. Decree accordingly."

2. The learned counsel for the appellants contended before me that the learned District Judge anti‑dated the bearing of the appeal without notice to the appellants and almost forced the appellant No: 2 to compromise with the respondent. He further contended that the learned District Judge was also not competent to dispose of the matter finally when the appeal before him was against the interim order passed under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance. Finally the learned counsel contended that it was apparent that the learned District Judge had shown unusual keenness in antidating the hearing of the appeal and disposing of the same on the date he was to retire from service.

3. I find no force in all the contentions raised above. It is difficult to believe that the learned District Judge forced the appellants to compromise with the respondent. The perusal of the compromise application shows that it is signed by Mr. Rochi Ram, Advocate for the appellants, who while endorsing his signature has mentioned that he was specially authorised to compromise the dispute. The appellant No. 2 who has filed an affidavit in support of the allegations in this Second Appeal has also signed the compromise application. It appears that the allegation against the learned District Judge is an after thought as nothing prevented the appellants to approach this Court immediately after they were coerced by the learned District Judge to compromise the matter. This Second Appeal was filed after a delay of nearly one and a half months. On the other hand the respondent has filed an affidavit stating that the compromise entered by the appellants was voluntary. Except a bare oral allegation of the appellant No. 2, there is no material whatsoever to justify a finding to the effect that the learned District Judge had forced the appellant No. 2 to compromise the matter with the respondent.

4. The second ground urged is equally without force as in the compromise application it was agreed by the appellants that the main case before the Court of the Controller shall stand disposed of in the terms of the compromise. Nothing in. law prevented the Appellate Court in giving effect to the compromise reached by the parties.

5. The last contention against the learned District Judge is equally without any foundation. The respondent in his counter -affidavit has asserted that the notice of the application filed by him for antidating the bearing of the appeal to the 30th of March 1966 was served on the counsel for the appellants before the date of hearing and as the parties had already reached the compromise, the same was drafted and signed by the parties in the presence of their counsel. These allegations have not been controverted in a rejoinder affidavit by the appellants. There is nothing on record before me to hold that the learned District Judge was anxious to dispose of the appeal before his retirement from service.

6. For the reasons given above, this appeal must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.

K.B.A.

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