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Civil Appeal No.l 7 of 1986, decided on 14th January, 1989.

(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 13 4 1983, in Writ Petition"No.10 of 1980).

(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960

Ss.6 & 7 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Religious Endowments Act, 1963, S.22 Administration, control, management and maintenance of Waqf property Assumption of Word "notification" Meaning, scope and import of Significance of word "notification" is quite exhaustive and its scope wide enough because of its emphasis on bringing of a matter in the notice of public in shape of its print, publication in press, as a book, newspaper, piece of music and engravings etc. Object is to bring matter in lime light and clear notice to public Any action shortfall or in derogation thereto, would not bring such action within scope and framework of term "notification" Meanings of word, "notification" are to be ascertained by reference to S5.6 & 7 of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Waqf Properties Act of 1960 Publication of notification, a necessary requirement Procedure for assumption of control, management and maintenance of waqf properties detailed. [Words and phrases].

Section 6 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960 postulated that notwithstanding anything contained in section 22 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1963, the Administrator may, by notification, take over and assume the administration, control, management and maintenance of a Waqf property. Legislature has referred to the word "notification" and no reference is made to its publication, as seen in section 7. Section 7(1) deals with petition to District Court against notification. It provided that any person claiming any interest in any Waqf Property in respect of which a notification has been issued under last preceding section may, within 30 days of the publication of such notification, petition to the District Court within whose jurisdiction a part of Waqf Property is situated for a declaration.

(i) that the property is not Waqf Property;

(ii) that the property is Waqf Property within the limits stated in the petition.

It is evident from the language of these provisions that the Legislature framed an adequate scheme of law for assumption of control and management of Waqf Property and providing of opportunity, procedure and forum to an interested person in such Waqf Property for the redress of grievance, if any. Under section 6, Administrator was empowered to take over any Waqf Property, but the section laid a condition precedent that it shall be taken over after a notification has been issued. Action of taking over of Waqf Property follows issuance of notification and not otherwise. Next it was postulated under section 7(i) that any interested person in such Waqf Property in respect of which notification has been issued may bring his claim in the District Court within 30 days of the publication of such notification. Here aggrieved person is provided with remedy of petition to District Court against notification. The limitation for preferring petition is thirty days. It starts running with effect from the publication of such notification. It is permissible to construe the meaning of "notification" by reference to the scheme of law regulating the procedure to be adopted by Administrator in assuming the control and management of Waqf Property; likewise the procedure to avail remedy against the action of Administrator. In view of the complete scheme of law the meaning of "notification" used in section 6 by necessary implication would include its publication. Thus, popular meaning has to be assigned to the word "notification" accompanying the word "publication" as used in section 7(1) of the Act. Publication of notification does not mean necessarily its publication in the official Gazette but its non publication in one of the manners, listed above, cannot be reconciled with its true meanings. Simply drawing of an order on the file of Administrator Waqf Property and not making it public, as in this case, would not give it legal character of notification in the popular use of the term.

Webster"s New International Dictionary rel.

(b) Interpretation of statutes

Court must construe a statute in such manner as to derive positive intention of Legislature for which same is framed Ordinarily, a word or phrase used in one section is not construed disjunctively from the same word or phrase used in another section as by doing so that might lead to erroneous conclusion resulting in defeat of intention of Legislature Expression used in other paragraphs or sections are not to be detached for purpose of interpretation Same are to be construed together more so when they are found mutually dependent.

Crawford"s Interpretation of Laws, pp.260 261 rel.

(c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960

S.7 Notification Validity of Publication of notification would be necessary to make it valid so as to enable any interested person to seek remedy against the same within specified time.

(d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960

Ss.6 & 7 Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.V11I, R.5Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44 Fact admitted in written statement Effect Petitioner"s averment in Constitutional petition that impugned notification was kept secret from them, admitted in written statement by respondents In presence of such admission of respondents, there was no choice except to hold that property was taken over by Authority without notification in violation of provisions of section 6 of Waqf Properties Act, 1960. [Admission].

P L D 1983 SC (AJ&K) 20; The Province of East Pakistan v. Major Nawab Khawaja Hasan Askary and others P L D 1971 SC 82 and Balkrishna Anant Hirlekar v. Emperor A I R 1931 Bom.132 ref.

Ss.6 & 7 Action preceding valid notification Validity of Action which had preceded valid notification could not be protected.

(f) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)

S.44 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960, S.7 Constitutional jurisdiction Term "adequate remedy" Meaning, scope and import of Non availing of adequate remedy when not to bar exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction Term "adequate remedy" would mean and include expeditious and efficacious remedy To bar remedy of Constitutional jurisdiction, remedy available under ordinary law, must be equally efficacious Courts are primarily created to administer justice which duty has to be discharged in adequate manner Extraordinary jurisdiction of writ has been conferred upon superior Courts to administer justice effectively, unobstructed by technicalities, to meet all eventualities. [Words and phrases].

(g) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)

S.44 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960, S.7 Remedy under ordinary law available to petitioner at the time of admission of his Constitutional petition Such petition, however, was not rejected on that ground Later on, when alternate remedy became non existent by limitation, High Court could not decline to give relief in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction.

Messrs S.S. Salar & Co. v. Ch. Muhammad Sarfraz and 2 others P L D 1984 SC (AJ&K) 77 rel.

(h) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act, 1960

Ss.6 & 7 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44 Notification for assumption of control, management and maintenance of shrine and attached property Such notification having not been published prior to taking possession of property was declared to be unlawful and of no legal effect as a result whereof, property had to be restored to appellants.

Muhammad Sayab Khalid for Appellants.

Sh. Abdul Aziz for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 14th January, 1989.

The appeal is addressed against the order of High Court passed on April 13, 1983, whereby the Writ Petition to declare the notification, issued on February 25, 1979, and order passed on February 10, 1980, as invalid and ultra vires and in consequence thereof restoration of possession of shrine and property attached therewith, was dismissed.

2. The appellants claimed as legal heirs of Sain Kamla Badshah, a saint, whose Shrine, built up property and lands attached with the Shrine, is situate in village Mohra Sharif, Tehsil Nikyal. The chequered history of litigation in the matter indicates that the dispute over the "Mazar" and property attached with it, started in Dogra Regime. After liberation of part of the State and establishment of the Azad Government, the Auqaf department time and again endeavoured to assume control and management of the "Mazar" and its attached property. But every time its efforts were frustrated by the appellants by approaching the superior authorities. On February 25, 1979, Administrator Auqaf issued notification under section 6 of the Waqf Properties Act, in order to take possession of the aforesaid property. Copies of the notification were despatched to, among others, Deputy Commissioner Kotli, Sub Divisional Magistrate Nikyal and Superintendent Printing Press for its publication in the official Gazette. On knowing the issuance of notification appellants approached the Chief Executive for interference and maintenance of status quo. The Chief Executive initially accepted the request and issued stay order. The matter was sub judice before the Chief Executive when on February 10, 1980, the Sub Divisional Magistrate Nikyal assumed the control and management of the Shrine and land by taking its possession. The Chief Executive finally declined to interfere and rejected the claim of appellants on June 27, 1980. On rejection of the claim by Chief Executive, notification made on February 25, 1979, was duly published in the official Gazette, on July 7, 1980.

3. Meanwhile on dispossession of property by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, on February 10, 1980, the appellants feeling aggrieved of the aforesaid action addressed a writ petition to the High Court on March 12, 1980. In Writ Petition, the appellants challenged the validity of notification and jurisdiction of Sub Divisional Magistrate. It was alleged that notification was invalid for want of its publication and orders of Sub Divisional Magistrate, ensuing it, were ultra vires. It was further averred that the appellants having no other adequate and efficacious remedy were constrained to invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court. The respondents contested the writ petition by repudiating all the allegations alleged therein.

4. The learned Judges of the High Court, dismissed the writ petition on the following grounds:

(i) that notification of February 25, 1979, was valid;

(ii) that the controversy raised in the Court necessitated detailed inquiry for decision of the alleged title of the parties, to the property in dispute, and that could be determined only in a petition under section 7 of the Waqf Properties Act; and

(iii) that an adequate remedy was available to the appellants under section 7 of the Waqf Properties Act, 1960.

5. Mr. Sayab Khalid, the learned counsel for the appellants, urged that decision of the High Court was erroneous as the ordinary meanings of the term "notification" were misconstrued. It was emphasized that publication of the notification in the official Gazette at subsequent stage supported to hold that the alleged notification was invalid. Sh. Abdul Aziz the learned counsel for the opposite side, supported the impugned order by referring to the language of notification and explained that copies of the notification were sent to various quarters; including the Superintendent Printing Press for its publication in the official Gazette. It, therefore, fulfilled the requisite qualifications, it was argued by the learned counsel.

6. The controversy emanating from the facts confines to interpretation of meanings of the term "notification" as contemplated under section 6 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Waqf Properties Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The grammatic meanings of word "notification" were examined by the learned Judges in the High Court, in the light of its definition described in Webster"s "New International Dictionary". The relevant definition is reproduced:

Notification means:

"To bring before the public, as for sale or distribution; to print, or cause to be printed and to issue from the press, either for sale or general distribution, as a book, newspaper, piece of music, engraving etc."

On going through the definition described above it has to be accepted that significance of word "notification: is quite exhaustive. Its scope is wide enough as its emphasis is on bringing of a matter in the notice of public in the shape of its print, publication in the press, p as a book, newspaper, piece of music and engraving etc. The object is to bring a matter in limelight and clear notice of the public. An action shortfall or in derogation to aforesaid description would not bring such action within the scope and framework of the term "notification".

7. The rule of interpretation is that the Court must construe the statute in a manner to derive positive intention of legislature for which the statute is framed. Ordinarily a word or phrase used in one section is not construed disjunctively from the same word or phrase used in another section as by doing so it may lead to an erroneous conclusion resulting in defeat of the intention of legislature. I Thus, the expression used in next paragraphs or sections are not to be detached for the purposes of interpretation. These are construed together more so when they are found mutually dependent. This view finds support from Crawford"s Interpretation of Laws pages 260 and 261. It is reproduced:

"Each word, phrase, clause and sentence are the elements from which the legislative intent is formed. The various words, phrases, clauses, and sentences make up the frame work which supports the legislative intent. They are mutually dependent. Co operatively, they convey the ultimate idea" and "The Court must construe the statute in its manner, for by failing to do so, the statute is not considered in its entirety and the intention of the legislature is likely to be defeated. The legislative, intent is just as apt to be lost where a word, phrase or sentence of the statute is rejected as where they are considered separate and apart from the rest of the statute. This is in accord without use of words."

8. The word "notification" is to be construed necessarily by a reference to the provisions of sections 6 & 7 of the Act, as the proposition under consideration has emerged from an action taken under these provisions. Provisions of both sections are interrelated and interdependent. Therefore, the meanings of word "notification" are to be ascertained in the light of these provisions and it is not to be construed in isolation of each other; as it may lead to an absurd conclusion.

9. We advert to sections 6 & 7 of the Act. Section 6 postulated that notwithstanding anything contained in section 22 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1963, the Administrator may, by notification, take over and assume the administration, control, management and maintenance of a Waqf Property. Here it may be mentioned that Legislature has referred to the word "notification" and no reference is made to its publication, as we shall see it next in section 7. Section 7(1) deals with petition to District Court against notification. It provided that any person claiming any interest in any Waqf Property in respect of which a notification has been issued under last preceding section may, within 30 days of the publication of such notification, petition to the District Court within whose jurisdiction a part of Waqf Property is situated for a declaration:

(i) that the property is not Waqf Property;

(ii) that the property is Waqf Property within the limits stated in the petition.

It is evident from the language of these provisions that the Legislature framed an adequate scheme of law for assumption of control and management of Waqf Property and providing of opportunity procedure D and forum to an interested person in such Waqf Property for the redress of grievance, if any. Under section 6, Administrator was empowered to take over any Waqf Property, but the section laid a condition precedent that it shall be taken over after a notification has been issued. Action of taking over of Waqf Property follows issuance of notification and not otherwise. Next it was postulated under section 7(1) that any interested person in such Waqf Property in respect of which notification has been issued may bring his claim in the District Court within 30 days of the publication of such notification. Here aggrieved person is provided with remedy of petition to District Court against notification. The limitation for preferring petition is thirty days. It starts running with effect from the publication of such notification. It is permissible to construe the meaning of "notification" by reference to the scheme of law regulating the procedure to be adopted by Administrator in assuming the control and management of Waqf Property; likewise the procedure to avail remedy against the action of Administrator. In view of the complete scheme of law the meaning of "notification" used in section 6 by necessary implication would include its publication. Thus, we have to assign popular meaning to the word "notification" accompanying the word "publication" as used in section 7(1) of the Act. Next the examine the meaning of word "publication". In Dictionary the word "publication" is described as

"communication to the public: public announcement: legal notification: the act or process of issuing copies for general distribution to the public: a published work: the distribution in print esp. in technical journals of a taxonomic name together with such descriptive or illustrative material as will characterize and distinguish the organism of group named:" It is agreed that there is no reference to publication of notification in the official Gazette. One may agree that publication of notification does not mean necessarily its publication in the official Gazette but its non publication in one of the manners, listed above, cannot be reconciled with its true meanings. Simply drawing of an order on the file of Administrator Waqf Property and not making it public, as in this case, would not give it legal character of notification in the popular use of the term. Therefore, agreeing with the contention of 1 the learned counsel for the appellants it is maintained that provisions of section 6 were only to be complied with when control and possession of Waqf Property was taken over in consequence of a notification duly published in one of popular methods of publication, as described above. This is not shown to have been done; nor it is claimed as such by the respondents.

10. It is evident that the Administrator made an order in the shape of notification with copies to various agencies. We are not in, possession of evidence whether the copies were in fact despatched to all these agencies or not. But the action of Sub Divisional Magistrate Nikyal leads in favour of its positive proof. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the impugned notification was not made public, in accordance with law as it remained folded in the file till July 7, 1980, when it was duly published.

11. If the High Court"s view is correct then in such a situation, the Waqf Property may be taken over by assuming its control and management, though no one knew the existence of a notification except the Administrator and couple of other Government agencies. In such situation any interested person in possession of property may be dispossessed and deprived of it, as in the instant case, without having any opportunity of knowing that the property was declared as Waqf Property and it was being taken over by the Administrator. This is not the law, nor the legislative intention can be moulded in such a shape.

12. The High Court"s view is unsustainable from another angle as well. For it is seen that under Section 7 it is postulated that any interested person in the property may seek declaration that the property is not Waqf Property or that it is Waqf Property within certain limits. The limitation for such petition is 30 days from the time of publication of the notification. Assuming that publication of the notification, as held by the High Court, was not a condition relevant to make it valid, then there was no sense in expressly describing that limitation would run from the day of its publication. Introduction of word "publication" cannot be described as superfluous. It has full bearing upon the significance and nature of the word "notification". If the intention of the law maker would have been different then in that case the word "publication" would not have been mentioned in Section 7. It would have been enough to describe that the petition may be instituted within 30 days from the day of notification. It seems ridiculous to suggest that word "notification" does not carry the meaning and scope of its unfolding and display to public in one of the popular manners.

13. The learned Judges in the High Court in support of their opinion relied on Abdullah Shah"s case (P L J 1983 SC (AJK) 46). Apart from the facts of that case the legal proposition, construed by the learned Chief Justice, was not analogous to the proposition under consideration. The relevant observation is reproduced:

" . . . . . . It may be observed that no provision even exists in the Ordinance indicating that the Rules would be operative from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Publication of the Rules in the Official Gazette, therefore, does not seem to be a condition precedent for their validity. Statutory Rules, made by the competent Authority (as the case is before us), ordinarily come into force as soon as they are framed unless of course it is otherwise provided in the relevant law or the rules; because whenever law requires publication in the Official Gazette as a necessary condition for coming into operation of the statutory rules it expressly says so."

In that case the moot point was as to when the rules came into force. The nature of proposition was altogether different. It is quite evident that aforesaid principle was enunciated strictly in the light of law relevant to that case. Moreover, at the end it was held that the law imposed no condition precedent for publication of the rules in official Gazette to give them legal character; had there been any such intention it would have been said so expressly. In this case, as noticed earlier, the position is quite otherwise. The aforesaid authority provided no guidance in the matter and it was of no help to the respondents.

14. The true meanings of the term were construed in "The Province of East Pakistan v. Major Nawab Khawaja Hasan Askary and others" (P.L.D. 1971 SC 82). Mr. Justice Wahiduddin Ahmad, who spoke for the Court, examined the meanings of word "notification" and its "publication" in the official Gazette in the light of the provisions of East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. In that case the Government ,of East Pakistan acquired rent receiving interest in the Waqf estates of the respondents under Section 3(1) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, by four separate notifications. The validity of these notifications was challenged in four suits filed by the respondents. The learned Judges arrived at the following conclusion:

"The above discussion clearly shows that a notification can be said to be published only when some means are adopted to communicate it to the public or to the party concerned in order to publish it. It is, therefore, not possible to hold in the present case that the impugned notifications were published on the date on which they were inserted in official Gazette. The respondents have challenged this fact ire the plaints. They have specifically alleged in it that the notifications were not published in accordance with law and they were published much later than .they came into force. The Courts below, therefore, were justified in going into the evidence for finding out whether the notifications were issued before the notified date as required by Section 3(1) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950."

In that case the disputed notifications were not published before the date on which they were to come into force. As the notifications were not found to have been published in the prescribed manner they were declared invalid and ultra vires.

15. In "Balkrishna Anant Hirlekar v. Emperor" (A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 132), an association was declared unlawful by notification issued under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. The notification was duly published in the official Gazette and action was taken against members of the association, next day. In view of short interval between the notification and police action, the conviction was quashed by declaring the notification invalid. The learned Chief Justice of Bombay, observed:

"But if the Government view is right, then in such a case the association has become unlawful though no body knows the fact except the Government and anybody may be prosecuted for being a member of that association without having had any opportunity of learning that the association has become unlawful. In my opinion this is not the law, and in order to prove that an association has been declared unlawful under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, the Government must not only insert the declaration in the official Gazette, but must publish the Gazette in the manner usually adopted for publishing such Gazette, and allow a reasonable opportunity to people concerned to see the Gazette."

The learned Chief Justice declined to uphold the validity of the notification though it was published in the official Gazette. It was held that unless a reasonable opportunity was allowed to people concerned to see the Gazette, mere publication of notification was insufficient to attain legal character. The logic behind the point was that an action sought to be imposed to deprive citizens of their valuable basic rights of association or property, it was in the interest of justice that concerned persons must have had an opportunity to have knowledge of the notification in order to seek an appropriate redress against it.

16. It may be relevant to refer to the pleadings of the parties to ascertain the true position from factual aspect of the proposition. In para 7 of the writ petition, it was averred that order dated February 25, 1979, of respondent No. 1 was kept secret. Rest of this para refers to the stay order issued by the Chief Executive on March 7, 1979. In written statement, the respondents admitted para. 7 as correct. Thus, the allegation of the appellants that the alleged notification, issued by the Administrator Waqf Property, was not made public and was kept secret, was admitted in written statement as correct. The learned Judges of the High Court failed to take notice G of these averments to understand the uncontroverted position of the controversy. In presence of aforesaid admission of respondents there is no choice except to hold that the property was taken over by the Sub Divisional Magistrate without notification in violation of provisions of Section 6 of the Act. The notification actually assumed its legal shape on its publication on July 7, 1980, and not earlier. .

17. Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for the respondents, invited our attention to the copy of notification dated July 7, 1980, and contended that the notification was duly published in the official Gazette; as such action of the Sub Divisional Magistrate which preceded the publication of notification was fully protected by it. I do not find force in the contention as the language used in Section 6 of the Act, suggests that action of taking over the administration, control, management and maintenance of the Waqf Property must follow the notification and not vice versa. The notification of July 7, 1980, may be valid notification as the same has been published. But an action) which precedes notification of July 7, 1980, cannot be protected.

18. Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel, further contended that alternate adequate remedy was available to the appellants under Section 7 of the Act; as such writ petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court. The contention is not sustainable. The term "adequate remedy" contemplated under the Constitution has invariably received attention of superior Courts of the sub continent. The consensus is that adequate remedy would mean and include an expeditious and efficacious remedy. In order to close the door to writ jurisdiction it I must be satisfied that remedy available under ordinary law was equally efficacious. In absence of such satisfaction exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot be refused. The Courts are primarily created to administer justice and the duty has to be discharged in adequate manner Extraordinary jurisdiction of writ is conferred upon superior Courts so that justice is administered effectively, unobstructed by technicalities, to meet all eventualities.

19. The High Court admitted the writ petition on 4 6 1980, for regular hearing. It was well known at all levels at that stage that remedy under Section 7 of the Act, as ordinary remedy, was available. But the petition was not rejected in limine on that ground. Later on when alternate remedy became non existent by virtue of limitation, the High Court could not decline to give relief in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. By admitting the writ, once a hope of relief was created, the High Court should not have refused to act at a much late stage. It obviously caused disappointment to the appellants, who by the time had no forum to seek redress.

20. In support of our view reference may be made to "Messrs S.S. Salar & Co. v. Ch. "Muhammad Sarfaraz and 2 others" (P.L.D. 1984 SC (AJ&K) 77). Relevant observations are as:

"Next is the point with regard to the availability of an alternate remedy. The adequacy of this remedy ought to be viewed or judged in the terms of comparative speed, expenses, convenience and effectiveness involved in case relief is allowed by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The High Court would generally decline to issue the high prerogative writs in cases where alternative and equally efficacious remedies are available. But then it does not mean that there is any constitutional bar to the High Court in exercising such a jurisdiction or authority. Nor is the rule of alternate remedy inflexible. The fact that the High Court will ordinarily decline to step in where the alternate remedy is available is not due to its want of jurisdiction but for the reasons of expediency. Each case is to be decided in light of its accompanying facts and circumstances. The High Court will not hesitate to exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction where refusal to do so, in its estimation, would prolong the agony. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case and considering the nature of the relief claimed therein rejection of the appellants" writ petitions by the learned High Court was a wrongful exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under law."

21. In that case the claim of the appellants sought to be determined, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, was based on facts constituting fulfilment of contractual obligations and damages sustained by the appellants. The High Court dismissed the writ as in its opinion alternate remedy through civil suit was available. This Court, reversed the finding of the High Court and remanded the case for its decision on merits. The present case is on a much better footing. It is evident that no serious effort was made to apply mind to the proposition as IK the writ was dismissed in most orthodox mechanical fashion. We are

unable to subscribe to the view of the High Court on this point.

2.2. The alleged notification in consequence of which the Shrine and property attached with it was taken over by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Nikyal, has been declared unlawful as a result the property is to be restored to the appellants. Therefore, it is not considered conducive to go into the merits of the case for settlement of the title) or interest in the property as alleged by the appellants. The appeal is accepted with costs. The order of the High Court is reversed and the order of Sub Divisional Magistrate Nikyall passed on February 10, 1980., by which Shrine and property attached with it was taken over, being ultra vires, is set aside and Shrine and property is ordered to be restored to the appellants.

A.A./ 248/S.C. A Appeal accepted.

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