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Second Appeal from original Order No. 685 of 1977, decided on 3rd December, 1978.

‑‑S. 13 (3) (a)(i)‑‑Ejectment of tenant‑‑Personal bona fide requirement‑ Proof‑‑Deposition made by landlord on oath that house in dispute would be occupied, held, could not be brushed aside merely on basis of supposition about which landlord was not cross‑examined‑‑Non appearance in witness‑box of person for whose benefit premises in dispute was sought to be got vacated was not of any consequence.

Soofi Muhammad Yasin and Brothers v. Dr. Major Abdul Had Khan P L D 1976 Kar. 1231 and Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Suba Khan PLD 1977 Lah. 1094 ref.

‑‑‑Ss. 13(3)(a)(i) & 15(4)‑‑Ejectment on ground of personal requirement‑‑Increase in rent‑‑Demand of‑‑Effect‑‑Increase in rent from Rs.100 to Rs.300 stretching over period of about fifteen years, which was compatible with marked fall in money value, undergone during that period, held, could hardly be considered ground weighty enough to warrant inference that ejectment proceedings against tenant were intended to be used as lever for increase in rent.

‑‑‑Ss. 13(3)(a)(i) & 15(4)‑‑Second appeal‑‑Concurrent findings of fact‑‑Re‑appraisal of evidence‑‑As to whether or not house alleged to be required for personal use would be utilized by landlord for that purpose, being question of fact on which concurrent finding had been given by two Courts below in favour of landlord and against tenant, re‑appraisal of evidence to come to different conclusion, held, was not permissible in second appeal.

Suba v. Siraj Din P L D 1977 Lah. 1263ref.

Hamid Mukhtar for Appellant.

Iftikhar Ahmad Dar for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 17th October, 1978.

This S.A.O. is directed against the order, dated 14‑12‑1977 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, whereby the appellant's first appeal against his ejectment from the house in dispute, ordered by the learned Rent Controller on 28‑5‑1977, was dismissed.

2. The respondent filed a petition against the appellant for his ejectment from Bungalow No. 11, Canal Park, Lahore, on the ground of default in payment of rent and personal use. The appellant contested the ejectment petition, but on the basis of the material produced before him the learned Rent Controller did not accept the ground as to the commission of default in the payment of rent but upheld the respondent's contention that the bungalow was needed by her bona fide for personal use. The case as put up by the respondent before the learned trial Court was that her daughter Mst. Asima Aziz, who was married with a Brigadier, was divorced by him as she has an insane daughter. The respondent contracted second marriage after the death of her first husband, and she is putting up in the house belonging to her second husband, which is also shared by his other brothers. In the said house she and her husband are utilizing only two bedrooms accommodation' and that her divorced daughter and the insane grand‑daughter are also living with her. It was further stated that the respondent's second husband was not agreeable to the stay of her insane grand‑daughter with her and wanted that she should be admitted to the Mental Hospital. The respondent was not ready for that and required the demised premises for her own use, where she alongwith her divorced daughter and insane grand‑daughter shall reside. On the basis of these facts proved before him, the learned Rent Controller was of the opinion that the house was bona fide required by the respondent for her personal use.

3. The appellant filed an appeal, but the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, who heard this appeal, upheld the findings of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the same. The only controversy which needs determination in the second appeal is as to whether or not the house is required by the landlady bona fide for her personal use. In this respect, the learned counsel for the appellant pleaded that in the ejectment petition it was not disclosed that the house was required by the respondent for the use of her daughter and insane grand daughter. He submitted that it was only through evidence that the respondent developed her this case. Her failure to disclose all these facts in the ejectment petition, according to the learned counsel, militated against her bona fide requirement. This objection on the part of the learned counsel is oblivious of the evidence on the record, wherein it has unequivocally been stated that the respondent shall occupy the house alongwith her daughter and insane grand‑daughter. When faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that it was highly improbable for the respondent to leave her second husband and start living in the house in dispute. The deposition made by the landlady on oath that the house will be occupied by her cannot. be brushed aside merely on the basis of supposition. She was not cross‑examined by the appellant on this point. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the objection raised by the learned counsel. It was next argued that the respondent's daughter, for whose benefit the house was sought to be got vacated did not appear in the witness‑box to support her. Learned counsel for the appellant cited Soofi Muhammad Yasin and Brothers v. Dr. Major Abdul Had Khan P L D 1976 Kar. 1231 and Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Suba Khan A P L H 1977 Lah. 1094 in support of his submissions.. In Soofi Muhammad Yasin's case the landlord, who was a Medical Practitioner, wanted to get the demised premises vacated, to expand his clinic to enable his two daughters, who were also in the same profession to join him, but these was evidence to show that the daughters were not willing to join the father in the proposed expansion. It was, under these circumstances, that non‑appearance of the landlord's daughters in the witness‑box was considered fatal to the ejectment petition. In Ghulam Mohyuddin's tse, it has been observed that the statement of the landlord as well; of the person for whose benefit the premises are sought to be acted is most relevant to determine the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord. This case is evidently not hit by any of these two rulings. It has been observed above, that the case as disclosed by the respondent, is that she shall reside in the house herself alongwith her daughter and insane grand‑daughter. There is no material on the file to show that the respondent's divorced daughter is reluctant to occupy the house in dispute, in case it is vacated by the appellant. In this view of the matter, non‑appearance of the respondent's daughter in the witness‑box is not of any consequence.

4. It was lastly argued that the respondent only wanted to increase the rent and that initially the house was leased out to the appellant at the rate of Rs.100 per month in the year 1960. In September 1960, the rent was increased to Rs.120 which was further raised to Rs.140 p.m. in the year 1964. The rent was further increased to Rs.200 per month it, the year 1968 and yet in the year 1973 another increase was made and the rent settled at Rs.300 per month. It was submitted that in February 1975 the respondent demanded an abrupt increase of Rs.150 per month, to which the appellant declined. Reference was also made to the previous ejectment order, which was obtained by the respondent against the appellant but was not executed as the rent was increased by the appellant from Rs.120 to Rs.200.

5. The increase in the rent from Rs.100 to Rs.300 stretching over a period of about fifteen years, which apparently is not compatible with the marked fall in the money value, undergone during this period in the circumstances of this case, can hardly be considered a ground weighty enough to warrant an inference that the instant ejectment proceedings are intended to be used as a lever for increase in the rent . The respondent while appearing as her own witness has amply explained the circumstances under which the previous ejectment order passed against the appellant in or about the year 1968 was not got executed against him.

I have gone through the statement of the respondent and I am fully satisfied with the explanation given by her. As to whether or not the respondent would utilize the premises, as alleged by her, is primarily a question of fact on which concurrent finding has been given by the two Courts below against the appellant. The re‑appraisal of evidence to come to a different conclusion, is not permissible in second appeal. In Suba v. Siraj Din P L D 1977 Lah. 1263 while examining the bona fide requirement of the landlord after discussion of the relevant case law on the subject it was observed:‑

"the own occupation by the landlord may include the occupation for need of‑ his dependents and that need might also have arisen due to the circumstances of his life, his social status or position, his social, moral or legal obligation, etc."

6. I respectfully agree with these observations. It is in evidence of the appellant, that his wife, who appeared as witness, admitted that the respondent's daughter has been divorced and that her grand daughter is insane. The respondent's residence with her second husband was also not denied. In the light of the evidence brought on the record, the two Courts below were fully justified to come to the conclusion that the house is required by the respondent bona fide for her residence. I affirm this finding.

7. As a result of the above discussion, this S.A.O. is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

8. The appellant is directed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in dispute to the respondent by 15th of January, 1979.

H . B . T . Appeal dismissed.

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